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If, contrary to my view, Poppers program cannot be executed in
its purity, we may try something entirely different, with the hope
that we shall not do injustice to the value of creativity in free
imagination and rigourous criticism.
Agassi (1975, p. 35)
The deductive inference of phylogeny, first dealt with
in some detail by Wiley (1975), continues to be called
into question (for an early negation see Hull, 1983; but
for a change of mind see Hull, 1999, p. 481). For ex-
ample, Cleland (2002, p. 483) concludes ‘‘there is little
in the practice of historical science that resembles what
is prescribed by falsificationism.’’ Olmstead (2001, p.
304) is even of the opinion that ‘‘Popper never ad-
dressed the question of how his philosophical frame-
work related to the singular history of evolutionary
diversification or to our ability to recover that pattern.’’
Rieppel (2002, p. 30, 2003) is somewhat more specific in
stating that ‘‘Poppers philosophy is not applicable to
cladistic analysis of phylogenetic relationships, because
. . . there is no deductive link between a hypothesis of
relationships and the character distribution on a tree
. . .’’ In his search for Kuhnian values (Kuhn, 1962),
Richards (2002) claims to have discovered that cladistic
parsimony cannot function as an unequivocal rule,
because different cladograms depend on ‘‘the social
factors that influence character individuation.’’ Then
there is de Queiroz and Poe (2001; see also Faith and
Trueman, 2001), who maintain that Poppers degree of
corroboration correctly interpreted is an inductive for-
malism, thereby tacitly denying an explication of falsi-
ficationism (Kluge, 2001). In the hope of achieving
more critical discussions in the future, I describe phy-
logenetic systematics in hypothetico-deductive terms,
sufficient I believe for it to be evaluated as a basis for
obtaining objective knowledge of species history.
Philosophical formalisms and related arguments are
placed in footnotes, or ignored altogether, with the
bulk of the text consisting of the most familiar termi-
nology and simplest examples of phylogenetic system-
atics that I can manage while still making my
arguments.
Whether or not all scientific discoveries are united by
the same underlying logic, there is a fundamental dif-
ference between the universal (predictive) and the his-
torical (postdictive) sciences, the nomothetic and the
idiographic, respectively. As Popper (1957, p. 143, italics
in the original) underscored,
It is the distinction between the interest in universal laws and the
interest in particular facts. I wish to defend the view, so often
attacked as old-fashioned by historicists, that history is charac-
terized by its interest in actual, singular, or specific events, rather
than laws or generalizations.
With that distinction in mind, Popper (1957, p. 146)
went on to state the condition for deducing historical
events:
In so far as we are concerned with the historical explanation of
typical events they must necessarily be treated as typical, as be-
longing to kinds or classes of events. For only then is the deduc-
tive method of causal explanation applicable.
That phylogenetic systematics exemplifies this method
of inference may be judged from the following sets of
arguments, 1–11, where b is background knowledge
(descent, with modification), c is character, e is evidence
(transformation series), h is hypothesis (cladogram,
phylogenetic tree) and n is number of terminal taxa
(species or monophyletic groups of species).
1. Darwins (1859) first two principles of evolu-
tion, ‘‘descent, with modification,’’ have long been
considered sufficient, as background knowledge, b,
in providing deductively testable hypotheses of species
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relationships.1 In light of just these premises an h can be
stated as species A and B share a more recent common
ancestral species than either does with species C, which
reduces to the familiar expression (A,B)C (Hennig, 1966,
p. 71; Liden, 1990). Thus, the origin of species or
monophyletic groups of species can be considered a
‘‘kind’’ of historical event.2
While the relative condition of species common an-
cestry, h, is specific enough to form a typical statement,3
to assume Darwins first principle alone, ‘‘descent,’’ as b,
is not a sufficient major premise (contra de Queiroz, 1992,
p. 305; de Queiroz and Gauthier, 1992, p. 452), because
descent is the property of the class of all monophyletic
groups—the condition of any particular group or corre-
sponding name being undefined. A polytomy is the most
that one can hypothesize while assuming just ‘‘descent.’’
Further, there can be no empirical basis, e, for testing h
without assuming something more as b, such as Darwins
second principle, ‘‘with modification.’’
Explicating phylogenetic systematics as a deductive
science treats the kind of historical event in question as a
numerical universal, not as a strictly universal (Stamos,
1996; see also Hull, 1983, p. 180; Kluge, 1999), where
each of the typical statements, (A,B) or (A,C) or (B,C),
stands for a finite, spatio-temporally restricted, and
historically connected, group of things, and for which
natural necessity, or lawfulness, cannot be claimed
consequently (contra Cleland, 2002; contra Rieppel,
2002). While numerical universals may be verifiable in
principle (Kitts, 1977, p. 189), it is clear that the typical
kind of statement at issue in phylogenetic inference
cannot be verified directly, by observation, because of
the time passed, nor can it be estimated with subjective
or objective (of the frequency kind) probability,4 be-
cause each statement is necessarily unique (Kluge, 2002;
see also Hennig, 1950, p. 114). As Patterson (1978,
p. 219) alludes to, ‘‘[t]he point at issue is . . . not the
distinction between universals and numerical universals,
but between universals and [historical] individuals.’’
Neither can this kind of typical statement be con-
sidered a natural kind. In the traditional sense of natural
kind (Mill, 1843), there is no a priori definable intrinsic
essential property of species. The cause of common
ancestry can be described only with regard to indeter-
minate initial conditions, i.e., all of the unpredictable
aspects of the situation of which the event is a part
(Kluge, 2002). Boyds (1990, 1991, 1999) attempt to
avoid the taint of traditional essentialism by specifying
underlying causal homeostatic mechanisms of species,
and groups of species, determined a posteriori as cluster
kinds, is equally unsatisfactory. The a posteriori defini-
tion still leaves open the question ‘‘what makes a ho-
meostatic mechanism a homeostatic mechanism for a
particular kind’’ (Ereschefsky, 2001, p. 107). Moreover,
whatever is ‘‘homeostatic’’ cannot, by definition, evolve!
2. A statement of h is but one part of a closed hy-
pothesis set, as determined by the number of terminal
taxa, n (Siddall and Kluge, 1997, p. 313).5 Although
there are not indefinitely many hn to be falsified, the
epistemic status of claims of relative recency of common
ancestry depends on recognizing the singular nature of
history—each species and transformation event being
necessarily unique, and the alternative statements of hn
being exclusive, such as (A,B)C or (A,C)B or (B,C)A.
An inclusive set of hn statements, such as (A,B)C and
(A,C)B and (B,C)A, which have been used to condi-
tionally probabilify a hypothesis of common ancestry,
would therefore represent an illogical thesis (Kluge,
2002).6 There cannot be a relevant ‘‘situation’’ with
regard to species where ‘‘[n]ature sometimes repeats
herself, presenting researchers with multiple examples
of a given type of historical phenomenon’’ (Cleland,
2002, p. 485), because each event of common ancestry
is necessarily unique (Kluge, 2002).7
3. For any hn there are n 2 basic, testable, state-
ments, which represent the phylogenetic informativeness
of the cladogram.8 Not only is the testable phylogenetic
1 Premises known to be false cannot serve as b, and therefore
assuming just ‘‘descent, with modification,’’ is not considered prob-
lematic (Siddall and Kluge, 1997, p. 320). Further, the hierarchy of
relative recency of common ancestry, given this interpretation of b,
cannot be judged an a priori truth in phylogenetic systematics (pace
Brady, 1994, p. 22). On the other hand, models are problematic and
cannot be part of the auxiliary assumptions of phylogenetic system-
atics (see argument set 5, below), because they are counterfactual
conditionals, of the general form if p were to have happened q would
have happened, where the supposition of p is contrary to the known
fact not-p.
2 The conditions defining a class or a kind, as opposed to those of a
natural kind, need not be lawfully related (Mahner and Bunge, 1997).
3 A particular that instantiates a class concept is considered
‘‘typical’’ of that class. For example, a monophyletic Squamata is
typical of the concept ‘‘clade,’’ just as a monophyletic Amniota is
another instance of that class.
4 This even includes maximum likelihood, where the inference
involves determining whether the present evidence could have reason-
ably come from the model if the hypothesis is correct. Although a
particular maximum likelihood estimate is a point probability, it is
determined none-the-less in reference to the conditional (frequency)
probabilities of the model, which are counterfactual conditionals (see
Footnote 1).
5 The set of hn for any n is ð2n 3Þ!=2n2ðn 2Þ! (Edwards and
Cavalli-Sforza, 1964, p. 73).
6 Objective probability was not rejected out-of-hand, as a pseudo-
problem (Gr€unbaum, 1989; Popper, 1983, p. 160), in the logical
arguments that led me to judge h as necessarily unique (Kluge, 2002).
Rather, I simply pointed out that deductive inference is not
‘‘burdened’’ by the problem of uncertainty (Watkins, 1984). What
may be relevant to one epistemology, such as statistical consistency
and model parameterization is to inductive inference, does not
automatically carry over to another.
7 Even the instrumentalists heuristic use of probability as the basis
for prediction, and not explanation, cannot be based on an illogical
thesis (Ariew, 1998).
8 This is equivalent to the empirical content of a hypothesis in
Popperian testability, 1 pðh; bÞ.
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information of each h of a set of hn precisely the same,
all of the alternative statements for a given hn are
equally bold and simple (Popper, 1963, p. 61; 1972, p.
81, 143; 1982, p. 131). For example, for n ¼ 3 there is
only one competing statement, (A,B) or (A,C) or (B,C).
These preconditions of testability are not considered
troublesome, because the phylogenetic system can ulti-
mately yield causal explanations (see argument set 11,
below). Given that increasing n increases the number of
testable statements is reason enough, in the logic of
scientific discovery (sensu Popper), to include more ter-
minal taxa in a phylogenetic analysis of relationships
(Kluge, 2001).
Since the number of competing hn and their empirical
content are matters of pure logic,8 not the logic of sci-
entific discovery, it is misleading to say that phylogenetic
hypotheses are ‘‘reconstructed’’ or trees are ‘‘created.’’
To whatever extent creative genius may be involved in
phylogenetic systematics (Popper, 1959, p. 32), it is
limited to the invention of more efficient and effective
methods for choosing among the logically possible al-
ternatives for large numbers of n.
4. All typical statements of hn are prohibitive, such as
(A,B)C and not (A,C)B or (B,C)A, as required of a
testable, falsifiable, hypothesis (Kluge, 2002). These
kinds of propositions might be formulated as negative
existential statements, where the falsifiability of the hy-
pothesis is made clearer. For example, one could say
that a cladogram (A,B)C does not exist on which
statements of transformation, e, can be causally ex-
plained as statements of homology (Kluge, 1999).
However, such an exercise contradicts the logic that
(A,B)C does exist, as a hypothesis.
5. Testability is a function of the improbability of h
(e.g., Popper, 1983, pp. 236–240). Paraphrasing Kluge
(1997, p. 88), assuming only ‘‘descent, with modifica-
tion,’’ b, the evidence, e, for (A,B), (A,C), and (B,C)
should be equally likely. However, if a large majority of
one of those possible kinds of e were to be observed in
an unbiased sample, say that which counts for (A,B),
then this is improbable given only that b,9 but not under
that b plus the postulated rooted cladogram (A,B)C. By
extension, we can say that such a result is expected if
(A,B)C were to be true, but not if it was false, and it is
under these circumstances of improbability that e can be
considered to support h (see argument set 9, below).10
The improbability argument and the concept of
support in Popperian testability are conditional on what
is assumed. As Popper (1963, p. 61; see also Popper,
1959, pp. 272–273) pointed out, the simplest h that can
be stated, in light of b,
offer us the best chance to submit them to severe tests: the sim-
pler theory has always a higher degree of testability than the
more complicated one.
As set forth in argument sets 1–3 (above), it takes no
more than Darwins first two principles of evolution to
formulate a testable hn, such as (A,B)C or (A,C)B or
(B,C)A, and the hypothesis of e that is used to test any
hn (see argument set 6, below). What could be simpler
than testing the set of such statements, hn, where only
one can be true, in light of b?
Related to the effect that simplicity has on the degree
of testability is the problem of ad hoc hypotheses (see
argument set 10, below; Footnote 16). As Popper went
on to argue:
One can show that the methodology of science (and the history
of science also) becomes understandable in its details if we as-
sume that the aim of science is to get explanatory theories which
are as little ad hoc as possible: a good theory is not ad hoc, while
a bad theory is. On the other hand one can show that the prob-
ability theories of induction imply, inadvertently but necessarily,
the unacceptable rule: always use the theory which is the most
ad hoc, i.e. which transcends the available evidence as little as
possible.
For example, conformity to a particular phylogenetic
hypothesis is frequently argued in terms of ad hoc ad-
ditions to the system, such as other assumptions and
evidence. Differential character weighting is ad hoc when
those schemes presuppose what cannot be tested, inde-
pendent of the phylogenetic analysis. Furthermore,
weighting of any kind, a priori or a posteriori, correlates
e by class, in reference to what is ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad,’’ but
that violates the assumption that each e be an inde-
pendent test of hn (Kluge, 1998).
6. The transformation series concept of Hennig (1966,
Fig. 21) constitutes evidence, e. e is temporal and his-
torical, not because of ontogeny or tokogeny, but be-
cause the concept of species, of which e is a part,
imposes it (Liden, 1990). Thus, metaphysically speaking,
there is a lineage system of change, i.e., one of evolution.
9 This desideratum excludes all those model assumptions whereby e
would be made more probable (see Footnote 1). Although (e.g.,
Popper, 1983, p. 238; italics in the original) used the calculus of
probability to introduce his concept of improbability, if e is to support
h it should not be probable on the background knowledge b alone by
pðe; bÞ << 1=2, he went on to observe that this simply amounts to
saying ‘‘the smaller pðe; bÞ, the stronger will be the support which e
renders to h . . .’’, or with regard to a significant degree of corrobo-
ration, pðe; hbÞ  pðe; bÞ >> 1=2. Likewise, my argument for the
improbability of phylogenetic hypotheses can be stated in terms of
conditional or logical probability (Kluge, 1997, p. 88; see also Kluge,
2001). See Footnotes 10, 14, and 15.
10 This is severity of test in Popperian testability,
Sðe; h; bÞ ¼ pðe; hbÞ  pðe; bÞ=pðe; hbÞ þ pðe; bÞ. Popperianism does not
have an absolute criterion for knowing the truth, but specifying the
conditions for truth is a trivial exercise. For example, in the
phylogenetic system, given three terminal taxa, the statement
‘‘(A,B)C is true’’ iff A and B share a more recent common ancestor
than either does with C; ‘‘(A,C)B is true’’ iff A and C share a more
recent common ancestor than either does with B; ‘‘(B,C)A is true’’ iff B
and C share a more recent common ancestor than either does with A.
See Footnote 9.
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The basic statements that phylogenetic systematists
actually use to test hn are the observable outcomes of
a hypothesized spatio-temporally restricted change, the
independent heritable modifications that distinguish
species from one another. These are phenotypic traits,
the plesiomorphic/apomorphic characteristics of or-
ganisms that are the result of that kind of causal
determinism. There is no one operational criterion for
determining these states. It can be anything that leads
to a testable hypothesis (Popper, 1959, p. 32), which
in the present case are the characteristics of different
species that are perceptually the same thing, cs.
11 Os-
tension, but not intensional definition, such as that
used to determine similarity relationships, may be
employed in these efforts, because it is logically con-
sistent with what is to be determined. While the a
priori testability of these ‘‘thing hypotheses’’ remains
little investigated, it is generally acknowledged as in-
volving character analysis/reanalysis, where the tests of
character compatibility and conjunction may be ap-
plied (Kluge, 1998).12 Arguably, as the result of such
a priori studies, cs will become more severely tested
for its objective reality, and consequently the more
severely e can then be said to test hn (see also argu-
ment sets 7 and 11, below).
Hennig (1966, p. 65) defined semaphoront, the char-
acter ‘‘bearer,’’ as the organism, which is in a certain
theoretically infinitely small time span of its life, during
which it is considered unchangeable. The importance of
the concept of semaphoront in the present context lies in
the fact that ‘‘in a system in which the genetic rela-
tionships between different things that succeed one an-
other in time are to be represented, we cannot work with
elements that change with time.’’ More generally, only
by insisting on semaphoront comparisons can cs be
tested and causally explained historically. While topo-
logical similarity may be one of the criteria employed in
phylogenetic systematics, in identifying character state
relations among semaphoronts representative of differ-
ent species, the pattern cladists principle of the topo-
logical invariance of taxa is not assumed (e.g., Brady,
1994, p. 27f). Obviously, social factors do not then
necessarily influence the individuation of characters
in phylogenetic systematics and thereby render the
application of parsimony ‘‘arbitrary or subjective’’
(contra Richards, 2002, p. 17).
It is common knowledge that only synapomorphies,
cs, not autapomorphies or symplesiomorphies, consti-
tute tests of hn, because only those empirical relations
have the potential to falsify that kind of h. More spe-
cifically, an objective criterion of falsification resides in
incongruent cs, because not both can be true. Incon-
gruent cs constitute evidence for a different cladogram,
only to the extent they have been sampled in an unbi-
ased manner (see argument set 5, above).
The following explicates e as a test of hn.
13 Assume a
rooted three-taxon cladogram, (A,B)C, and three hy-
pothesized binary-coded transformation series distrib-
uted as 110, 101 and 011 (state 1 is apomorphic). Thus,
the congruent cs has the taxonomic distribution A1, B1,
C0, while the incongruent cs have the distributionsA1, B0,
C1 and A0, B1, C1. Next, consider the alternative con-
clusions which follow logically from conjoining the clad-
ogram (A,B)C with the congruent and incongruent cs:
(conclusion 1) a cladogram alone does not declare the
derived states of a congruent cs are homologues (are of a
common origin). As Sober (1988, pp. 132–135) correctly
points out, something more is needed. (conclusion 2)
However, a cladogram by itself does declare the de-
rived states of an incongruent cs are of independent origin
(Farris, 1983, p. 13). Thus, it is only in this latter sense
that cs constitutes a decisive test, assuming only b—that
an incongruent cs can be said to count against a
hypothesis of sister group relationships.
Some think that falsification in Poppers logic of
scientific discovery is an ‘‘asymmetrical, all-or-nothing
affair’’ (e.g., Rieppel, 2003, pp. 262, 265, 269, 270).
However, deductive arguments can never show that
their conclusion of falsity is true. The decisiveness of the
logical truth is irrelevant, for there is after all the con-
junction of auxiliary assumptions, such as b. The most
deductive arguments can offer scientists is rational, ob-
jective choice among empirical hypotheses. That choice
is provided when falsification is applied simultaneously
to all of the members of a set of hn. This choice is not a
function of having to assume ‘‘descent, with modifica-
tion,’’ but is the logical consequence of any h being part
of a closed hypothesis set, where falsification applies
symmetrically. Those who define Popperian philosophy
in terms of syntactical certainty fail to grasp its real
goals, that of objectivity and rationality.
7. It also follows from the improbability argument
above (see argument set 5), where only incongruent e
11 According to observational theory, pure observation reports are
used to erect an inductivist epistemology. In the absence of such
reports (as revealed, for example, by incongruent characters, regardless
of a priori tests), the emphasis has shifted to the importance of
perceptual theory (Ryle, 1949), which is readily adapted to Poppers
deductive epistemology (Popper, 1963, pp. 201–214); see Footnote 14.
In the present case, synapomorphy, cs, is epistemologically accessible.
12 Character analysis/reanalysis in phylogenetic systematics does
not include a test of similarity (sensu Patterson, 1982), because it
involves induction, which can lead only to an abstract (class) concept
of taxa. Denying the relevance of observational theory and similarity,
phylogenetic systematics is left to focus on what may be perceptually
the same thing (Kluge, 2003; see Footnote 12).
13 When the consequent of an implication is denied in deductive
logic it is modus tollens, e.g., if h, then not e=e is false/therefore, h is
false (Rieppel, 2003). In the present case, if hðA;BÞC then not e1;0;1 or not
e0;1;1=e1;1;0 is false/therefore, hðA;BÞC is false; if hðA;CÞB then not e1;0;1 or
not e0;1;1=e1;1;0 is false/therefore, hðA;CÞB is false; if hðB;CÞA then not e1;0;1
or not e0;1;1=e1;1;0 is false/therefore, hðB;CÞA is false.
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counts as a falsifier, that severity of test increases with
the number of those tests that have been carried out.
Thus, the more tests the better (Popper, 1957, pp. 106–
107; 1983, p. 238). In phylogenetic systematics, severity
of test has been identified with the simultaneous analysis
of cs, and which is maximized in the results obtained
from an unpartitioned data matrix (i.e., the total evi-
dence of Kluge, 1997). Congruence corroborates shared
character states as homologues (see argument sets 8–10,
below).
8. The more severe the test e, as supporting evidence
of h, in light of b, the greater the power of h to causally
explain e, in light of b.14 Delimiting e operationally,
as an inferred transformation from plesiomorph to
apomorph, the synapomorphous states, cs, that can be
optimized as spatio-temporally restricted on h are
postdicted homologues (see argument set 10, below).
The cause of common ancestry is not explained with
regard to its effect, homology; quite the opposite, the
phenomenon of homology is explained with regard to its
cause, common ancestry. This is a typical example of the
when/where explanandum of a deductive historical
scheme of causal explanation, and it is without vicious
circularity, i.e., epistemological dependence (contra
Brady, 1994, pp. 11 and 13). That which is postdicted is
not a necessary consequence of that which is assumed, b,
because phylogeny is not defined in terms of homology
(see Hennig, 1966, Fig. 21). Neither can circularity be
claimed in the actual practice of phylogenetic system-
atics, because not all cs fit the definition of homology,
even though all homologues are cs (Hull, 1967, p. 177;
contra Brady, 1994, p. 25).
9. The corroboration of h by e, in light of b, is simply
the measure of the degree of support given by e to h, in
light of b (see argument set 5, above).15 The alternative
statements of hn can be compared objectively for the
degree to which they have been falsified by the critical
evidence, and therefore the difference between optimal
and suboptimal hn is an objective measure of the mag-
nitude of evidential support (Popper, 1959, 1983; Kluge,
2002, p. 591; Grant and Kluge, unpublished). A mean-
ingful metric of this kind of support depends on the
assumption that all of the cs used in an analysis of hn
have achieved the same level of testability (Kluge, 1997,
p. 93). In any case, falsification in phylogenetics cannot
be judged naive, because there is sophistication in the
degree to which the competing hn are evaluated in an
objective manner.
10. Explanatory power14 and degree of corrobora-
tion15 are maximized by minimizing e on h, in light of b,
according to the ‘‘rule of parsimony’’ (Popper, 1959,
p. 145). According to the logic of scientific discovery,
enjoining parsimony protects the falsifiability of the phy-
logenetic system from going to zero (see argument set 5,
above).10;16 In the practice of phylogenetic systematics,
the hypothesis that has the greatest explanatory power
and is the most corroborated, in light of b, is the h that
requires the fewest transformations counted on the path
between ancestor and descendant, i.e., the sum of the
patristic differences (Farris, 1970).
The fact that character states must be optimized at
each node to identify the most parsimonious hn means,
coincidentally, that nothing more than b need be as-
sumed (such as the counterfactual conditionals of a
stochastic model of evolution) to provide a causal ex-
planation of cs as homology (contra Sober, 1988, pp.
132–135). Also to be borne in mind, a cs that counts
against a particular h, such as (A,B), must count equally
for one of the alternatives, such as (A,C) or (B,C). This
is another product of pure logic.
The deductive argument for parsimony summarized
above is not to be confused with justifications of good-
ness of fit (including maximizing explanatory power, by
minimizing ad hoc assumptions) or simplicity (efficiency,
improbability) of evolution. For example, Hennigs
(1966, p. 121) auxiliary principle, which has long served
as the basis for goodness of fit in phylogenetic system-
atics (see also Kluge and Farris, 1969, p. 7; Wiley, 1975,
p. 236; 1981, p. 20; Eldredge and Cracraft, 1980, p. 67;
Farris, 1983, p. 8; Schuh, 2000, p. 116), states that ‘‘the
presence of apomorphous characters in different species
is always reason for suspecting kinship [i.e., that the
species belong to a monophyletic group], and that their
origin by convergence should not be assumed a priori. . .
[P]hylogenetic systematics would lose all the ground
on which it stands if the presence of apomorphous
14 This is explanatory power in Popperian testability,
Eðh; e; bÞ ¼ pðe; hbÞ  pðe; bÞ=pðe; hbÞ þ pðe; bÞ. See Footnotes 9 and
10.
15 This is degree of corroboration in Popperian testability,
Cðh; e; bÞ ¼ pðe; hbÞ  pðe; bÞ=pðe; hbÞ  pðeh; bÞ þ pðe; bÞ. If e neither
supports nor undermines h, in light of b, then Sðe; h; bÞ ¼ Eðh;
e; bÞ ¼ Cðh; e; bÞ ¼ 0. Sðe; h; bÞ;Eðh; e; bÞ and Cðh; e; bÞ are negative
when e undermines h, in light of b, and Sðe; h; bÞ;Eðh; e; bÞ and
Cðh; e; bÞ are positive when e supports h, in light of b. Sðe; h; bÞ ¼
Eðh; e; bÞ ¼ Cðh; e; bÞ ¼ 1 only when e absolutely contradicts h, in
light of b, and only when pðe; hbÞ ¼ 1; pðe; bÞ ¼ 0, and pðh; bÞ ¼ 0 can
Sðe; h; bÞ ¼ Eðh; e; bÞ ¼ Cðh; e; bÞ ¼ þ1. See Footnotes 9 and 10.
16 When Farris (1983, p. 8) justified the use of parsimony with
regard to explanatory power, by minimizing requirements for ad hoc
hypotheses of homoplasy (see argument set 5, above; Popper, 1963, p.
61), he credited Wiley (1975) for the Popperian testability argument.
However, Wileys (1975, pp. 237, 243) statement, ‘‘that a hypothesis of
homology based on morphological comparisons which has been
rejected the least number of times relative to other possible hypotheses
is to be preferred over those other hypotheses,’’ lacks epistemological
reason, and on its face is a justification for clique analysis, not
parsimony. The preferred largest clique refers only to congruent e,
whereas the most parsimonious cladogram refers to all e, congruent
and incongruent (Kluge, 1976; see argument set 7, above). Also,
Farriss (1983) descriptive efficiency is an operational extension of his
parsimony justification; it has no epistemological standing of its own.
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characters in different species were considered first of all
as convergences (or parallelisms), with proof to the
contrary required in each case.’’ Secondly, Felsenstein
(1983, p. 322; see also Humphries and Funk, 1984,
p. 330; Richards, 2002, p. 13) underscores the connec-
tion between parsimony and simplicity of the evolu-
tionary process when he states that ‘‘[p]arsimony
methods try to find that tree which requires the fewest
changes of character state. They originated as the
method of minimum evolution that Edwards and
Cavalli-Sforza . . . applied to gene frequency data, and
were applied to discrete morphological characters by
Camin and Sokal . . .’’
11. Increased knowledge can also result from a cycle
of checking and rechecking the cs that is incongruent
with the most parsimonious, total evidence, h, in light of
b (Kluge, 1998; see also Hennig, 1966). What are causally
explained as historically the same things (the identity
relation of homology) may be expected to increase as the
systematic error of incongruent cs is identified and re-
moved with character state redefinition and/or character
recoding.17 Accordingly, each severely tested historical
thing will come to be defined ostensively with regard to a
unique scientific term. There is one commensurable
viewpoint for which there is a direct ostensively defined
scientific language. Naming need not be a social process
in science (contra Kuhn, 1977, pp. 309–313), and there-
fore phylogenetic inference is not necessarily scientifi-
cally indeterminate (sensu Richards, 2002, p. 18). For all
intents and purposes objective reality may be discovered
in phylogenetic systematics.18
Given these 11 sets of arguments, what verdicts might
be rendered by open-minded philosophers and scientists
with regard to the Popperian nature of phylogenetic
systematics? One possibility is that the case has not been
made, because the purity of Popperianism cannot be
executed (see epigraph). For example, Popperianism is
concerned with making conditional scientific predic-
tions, which requires scientific laws, and the most that
any historical science can manage is the discovery of
unique events and the retrodiction of trends. Another
obvious verdict is that the combination of footnotes and
text merely flesh out what Popper came to realize later in
his life, that evolutionary theory could have scientific
character. Relevant to the precis at hand, he said
(Popper, 1980, p. 611), ‘‘It appears as if some people
would think that the historical sciences are untestable
because they describe unique events. However, the de-
scription of unique events can very often be tested by
deriving from them testable predictions or retrodic-
tions.’’ A detailed discussion of this expanded concept of
what is empirical in evolutionary biology, and phylo-
genetic inference in particular, can be found in Stamos
(1996, p. 165). Yet another verdict is that my arguments
form a logical system for achieving objective historical
knowledge, independent of the Popperian formalisms to
which I appealed—an epistemology involving statements
and contradiction, which is constrained by the suffi-
ciency of ‘‘descent, with modification’’ as background
knowledge. The salient features of this evolutionary
system are the spatio-temporal restrictedness and his-
torically contingent nature of lifes patterns and pro-
cesses. This epistemology can have nothing to do with
true belief, because its concern is for the testability of
improbable hypotheses. Falsifiability is then a norma-
tive proposal about what we should and should not
regard as scientific in the study of history. At least that
much is Popperian (Notturno, 2003).
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